



DUMUNC

XL 

Background Guide

Joint Crisis Committee: The Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia



Chair

Jude Reece

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Above: The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in August 2024

Letter from the Dais

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to DUMUNC XL! We're elated to have you here! Whether you're a longtime Model United Nations enthusiast or a newcomer to this exciting extracurricular event, we hope this committee will be productive, compelling, and (most importantly) fun for all involved!

The problems you will tackle and the crises that will arise over the course of the weekend will require out-of-the-box thinking and creative problem solving on your behalf. We hope all the delegates can work together to create these innovative solutions. Most of all, we want you all to relax and enjoy this weekend while learning a lot about the art of diplomacy, water security, and the fascinating geopolitical dynamics surrounding the Nile River!

As your chairs, we hope to make this committee fun and memorable for everyone. We will work hard to make sure that everyone's voices are heard in both moderated and unmoderated debate. If any problems arise over the course of the committee, or if you have questions about DUMUNC or Duke in general, feel free to ask at any time during the course of the conference. Good luck to you all and we hope you have a lot of fun this weekend!

Sincerely,

Jude Reece and Someone Else

Chairs, GERD Ethiopia

Expectations for Debate

Delegate Conduct

While we expect to see lots of spirited debate over the course of the weekend, we expect that delegates conduct themselves with civility at all times. Any violations of the DUMUNC Code of Conduct will result in automatic disqualification from awards considerations. Please contact your chairs or a member of DUMUNC staff either privately in-person or via our anonymous reporting form if you have concerns relating to delegate conduct. Aside from that, we will be watching you closely to observe how you work together with your fellow delegates, advocate for your beliefs, and advance your character in the backroom to determine award placements.

Committee Structure

This is a joint crisis committee, which involves parliamentary procedures and delegate actions not present in general assembly or specialized bodies. In addition to advocating for their character's and country's interests during moderated and unmoderated caucuses as typical in most Model UN bodies, delegates will be expected to write **crisis notes**. Crisis notes are private notes written **in-character** that are designed to advance your own interests hidden from the public eye. We will review how this process works for all those unfamiliar with crisis committees at the beginning of the first committee session. If at any point you do not know what is happening or how to do something, **please let your chair know**—we are here to help!

Course of the Crisis

The crisis chairs and crisis staff for JCC: GERD have outlined a few initial crises that the delegates of both countries will face surrounding the GERD (see the “GERD: Egypt’s Role” section for more), but after that, we are very open to take the joint committees in whatever direction the delegates steer them in. We would highly encourage both sides of the committee to communicate with one another frequently in public or in private, in the context of peace or in the context of conflict (armed or otherwise). This said, our primary restriction is that we will not allow both sides to engage in warfare early in the committee. We want to see both sides attempt **IN GOOD FAITH** to come up with mutually beneficial negotiated settlements or some other way of ensuring their well-being short of a costly and deadly armed conflict. Of course, there are other ways to interfere with the other side outside of armed conflict too, which we encourage delegates to explore to the fullest extent possible through frontroom or in backroom arcs.

Introduction

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is one of Africa's most ambitious infrastructure projects. Located on the Blue Nile River in Ethiopia's Benishangul-Gumuz region, the dam is designed to generate hydroelectric power and drive economic development. However, GERD has also been at the center of geopolitical tensions between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan. Understanding the historical background of the GERD requires an exploration of Ethiopia's hydropower ambitions, colonial-era treaties, and the project's evolution over time.

Ethiopia has long sought to harness its vast water resources for economic growth. With an estimated hydropower potential of over 45,000 megawatts, the country has faced challenges in utilizing this capacity due to financial constraints and regional political considerations (International Energy Agency, 2019). Since the mid-20th century, Ethiopian leaders have envisioned major dam projects on the Blue Nile, the river contributing about 85% of the Nile's flow. With the GERD's completion in 2023, Ethiopia finally realized this initial vision, but several problems loom on the horizon, with relations with our downstream neighbors casting the longest shadow...

Delegates in this committee must be prepared to navigate the complex diplomatic considerations surrounding the GERD, particularly as they relate to our sister committee—GERD: Egypt. How should Ethiopia approach relations with Egypt in light of their distaste for the GERD? What role should other states on the Nile rivers, other regional powers in Africa, and great powers outside of Africa play in the resolution of GERD-related affairs? What domestic or international groups support or do not support the GERD? How should we respond to various crises that arise in relation to the GERD? As that last question implies, delegates should be prepared to respond quickly to news reports related to delegate- and news-driven actions. These questions and others will form the agenda of DUMUNC XL's GERD JCC committees.

Historical Background

Overview:

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has been a focal point of geopolitical tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia, with Sudan also playing a significant role. At the heart of the dispute is the Nile River, a critical water source for all three nations. Egypt, heavily dependent on the Nile for its water supply, views GERD as a potential existential threat. Ethiopia, on the other hand, considers the dam essential for its economic development and energy security. The conflict over GERD is rooted in a complex history of colonial-era treaties, regional power dynamics, and competing national interests.

20th Century Treaties and Water Rights:

The first formal agreement related to Nile water rights between Ethiopia and colonial powers was the 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty, signed between Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia and Britain (representing Sudan). The treaty stipulated that Ethiopia would not undertake projects on the Blue Nile, Lake Tana, or the Sobat River that would significantly alter the river's flow without British consent. Ethiopia later disputed the treaty's interpretation, arguing that it was signed under colonial coercion and does not bind a sovereign Ethiopia today.

The 1929 Nile Waters Agreement between Britain (on behalf of Egypt and Sudan) and Egypt granted Egypt the majority of the Nile's water allocation and gave it veto power over upstream projects. Ethiopia, which was not a party to the agreement, rejected its legitimacy, viewing it as an imposition of colonial-era hegemony.

The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement in 1959 between Egypt and Sudan further entrenched Egypt's dominance over the Nile. This treaty allocated 55.5 billion cubic meters of Nile water annually to Egypt and 18.5 billion cubic meters to Sudan, with no provisions for Ethiopia or other upstream states. Ethiopia has consistently rejected this agreement, arguing that it was signed without its participation and denies its rights to Nile water utilization.

These old negotiations have sown present-day mistrust between Ethiopia and Egypt when negotiating over GERD-related affairs. But why did Ethiopia build the GERD in the first place?

Ethiopia's Hydroelectric Ambitions and Rationale for Constructing the GERD

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is one of Africa's most ambitious infrastructure

projects, reflecting Ethiopia's strategic vision for economic development, energy security, and regional influence. Since its initial introduction in 2010 by Ethiopian officials, GERD was intended to address Ethiopia's chronic electricity shortages, support industrialization, and assert the country's rightful share of Nile water resources. Ethiopia's motivations for building GERD stem from a combination of economic necessity, national pride, and geopolitical considerations, all of which underscore the dam's central role in the country's long-term development strategy.

A primary reason for Ethiopia's pursuit of GERD is the urgent need to address its energy deficit. Despite being one of the fastest-growing economies in Africa, Ethiopia has long suffered from unreliable electricity access, with nearly half of its population lacking consistent power. The GERD, with its planned capacity of 6,450 megawatts, will more than double Ethiopia's energy production, significantly improving electrification rates and supporting industrial expansion. Reliable and affordable electricity is essential for Ethiopia's efforts to transition toward an industrialized economy, attracting both domestic and foreign investments in energy-intensive sectors such as manufacturing, mining, and agro-processing. Additionally, the availability of surplus electricity enables Ethiopia to position itself as a regional energy hub, with plans to export power to neighboring countries such as Sudan, Kenya, and Djibouti, generating much-needed foreign exchange revenue.

Beyond energy security, GERD is a crucial tool for water resource management, allowing Ethiopia to better regulate the seasonal variability of the Blue Nile. Historically, Ethiopia has contributed over 85% of the Nile's water through the Blue Nile, yet it has lacked significant reservoirs to store and utilize this critical resource. By constructing a reservoir with a capacity of 74 billion cubic meters, Ethiopia can manage water flow more efficiently, reducing seasonal fluctuations and mitigating both droughts and floods. This controlled release of water will not only benefit Ethiopia but also help Sudan by preventing destructive flooding, stabilizing agricultural irrigation, and improving hydroelectric generation at Sudanese dams. In contrast, Egypt has voiced concerns that GERD could reduce its water supply, although Ethiopia insists that careful coordination of water releases will prevent any adverse downstream effects.

The dam also carries significant symbolic and political weight within Ethiopia. Funded largely through domestic sources, including public bond sales and government contributions, GERD represents a statement of national self-reliance and resilience. Ethiopia has historically been marginalized in Nile water agreements, particularly the 1929 and 1959 treaties that allocated the majority of the river's waters to Egypt and Sudan, effectively excluding Ethiopia from meaningful utilization of its own resources. The GERD, therefore, serves as a direct challenge to these colonial-era agreements, positioning Ethiopia as an assertive player in regional water politics. Domestically, the dam has been used to rally national unity, especially in times of political turbulence, with successive Ethiopian administrations presenting it as a unifying project that

transcends ethnic and political divisions.

Moreover, GERD is expected to have significant economic spillover effects beyond electricity production. The construction of the dam has created tens of thousands of jobs, stimulating various sectors such as construction, logistics, and infrastructure development. The dam will also provide crucial support for Ethiopia's agriculture sector by ensuring more consistent water availability, reducing soil erosion, and improving irrigation systems. These improvements are particularly important for Ethiopia's long-term food security goals, as well as for stabilizing the livelihoods of millions of smallholder farmers who depend on predictable water access for their crops.

Egypt's Concerns: Reasons for Opposing the GERD

While the GERD holds the potential to transform Ethiopia's energy sector and economic prospects, it has the potential to ruin those of its downstream neighbors—most notably Egypt. For Egypt, a country that relies on the Nile River for nearly 97% of its freshwater needs, the dam represents an existential threat to its water security, agricultural stability, and overall national security. Egypt's concerns over GERD stem from fears of reduced water availability, economic and environmental consequences, and the potential for regional instability, all of which have intensified diplomatic tensions between the two nations.

One of Egypt's primary concerns is the impact of GERD on its water supply. Egypt is heavily dependent on the Nile River, particularly the Blue Nile, which contributes about 60-70% of the total Nile flow. Historically, Egypt has been protected by the 1929 and 1959 Nile Water Agreements, which granted it the majority of the river's water—55.5 billion cubic meters (BCM) annually, while Sudan received 18.5 BCM. These agreements, however, excluded upstream countries like Ethiopia from significant water utilization. With GERD's massive reservoir—74 BCM, nearly equivalent to Egypt's total annual allocation—Egypt fears that the dam's filling process and long-term operation could reduce the volume of water flowing into the Aswan High Dam, which is essential for its water storage and hydroelectric generation. A rapid filling of GERD, particularly during years of drought, could leave Egypt vulnerable to severe water shortages.

Egypt's second major concern relates to agriculture and food security, both of which are directly linked to the Nile's water supply. Approximately 95% of Egypt's cultivated land depends on irrigation from the Nile, and any reduction in water availability could have catastrophic consequences for Egyptian farmers. A decrease in Nile water levels could lead to lower agricultural yields, increased desertification, and heightened food insecurity for Egypt's growing population of over 100 million people. The Nile Delta, one of the most fertile agricultural regions in the world, is particularly at risk, as reduced river flow could exacerbate saltwater intrusion from

the Mediterranean Sea, making farmland unusable. This, in turn, could increase food imports, raise commodity prices, and place further strain on Egypt's economy.

Beyond water scarcity and agricultural impacts, GERD also raises economic and hydropower concerns for Egypt. The Aswan High Dam, built in the 1960s, is crucial for hydroelectric power generation and flood control in Egypt. A reduction in upstream water flow due to GERD could limit Egypt's ability to generate hydropower, increasing dependence on fossil fuels and raising energy costs for both industry and households. Additionally, fluctuations in water flow caused by GERD's operations could disrupt navigation in the Nile, affecting industries and the movement of goods. Given that Egypt's economy is already strained by high unemployment, foreign debt, and inflation, any disruption to water access or agricultural production could destabilize the country's economic foundation.

The geopolitical implications of GERD further exacerbate Egypt's concerns. Egypt has long viewed itself as the dominant power in the Nile Basin, and its historical treaties granted it a privileged position in managing Nile water resources. However, Ethiopia's decision to construct GERD without prior approval from Egypt represents a fundamental shift in regional power dynamics. The dam challenges Egypt's historical dominance and weakens its ability to dictate Nile water policies. Egyptian officials worry that GERD could set a precedent for other upstream nations—such as Uganda, Kenya, and South Sudan—to construct their own large-scale water projects, further reducing Egypt's control over the Nile. Egypt also fears that Sudan, which initially expressed concerns about GERD but later showed support for the project, could shift its alliances away from Cairo and towards Addis Ababa, altering regional strategic balances.

Egypt's frustrations are further fueled by Ethiopia's unilateral approach to filling GERD's reservoir. Despite years of negotiations, Ethiopia has proceeded with multiple filling phases without reaching a legally binding agreement on coordinated water management and dispute resolution mechanisms. Egypt, along with Sudan, has repeatedly pushed for a legally enforceable deal that ensures minimum guaranteed water flows and mechanisms for handling drought years. Ethiopia, however, has resisted external pressure, arguing that GERD is a sovereign project that does not require Egyptian approval. This diplomatic deadlock has led Egypt to escalate its concerns to the United Nations, the African Union, and the Arab League, seeking international intervention to secure its water rights.

The possibility of regional instability due to GERD also looms large over Egypt's security concerns. Egyptian officials have repeatedly described the Nile as a "red line" and have not ruled out military action if they perceive GERD as an imminent threat to national survival. Egypt has strengthened military ties with Sudan and conducted joint military exercises, signaling that it is prepared to defend its water rights by force if necessary. While direct military confrontation remains unlikely, the risk of heightened regional tensions, proxy conflicts, or sabotage efforts

remains a pressing concern. GERD has already exacerbated divisions between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan, raising the specter of long-term geopolitical instability in the Horn of Africa and the broader Nile Basin.

In sum, Egypt's opposition to GERD is driven by deep-seated fears over water security, agricultural sustainability, economic stability, and geopolitical influence. The Nile is not just a river for Egypt—it is the country's lifeline, and any perceived threat to its flow is regarded as a direct challenge to national survival. While Ethiopia views GERD as a symbol of economic progress, Egypt sees it as a potential catastrophe that could destabilize its fragile water-dependent economy. The failure to reach a binding agreement on GERD's operation has only deepened tensions, making water diplomacy between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan one of the most pressing geopolitical issues in Africa today. Whether through negotiations, legal mechanisms, or international mediation, Egypt remains committed to ensuring that its access to the Nile remains protected, predictable, and sustainable for generations to come.

Previous Egyptian-Ethiopian GERD Negotiations

Since Ethiopia's announcement of the project in 2011, Egypt and Ethiopia have engaged in multiple rounds of negotiations, often mediated by international actors, in an attempt to resolve their differences over the dam's impact on the Nile River. Despite decades of diplomatic talks, high-level summits, and third-party interventions, the two nations have failed to reach a legally binding agreement on the operation and filling of GERD. Ethiopia has repeatedly asserted its right to develop its water resources without external interference, while Egypt has viewed the dam as an existential threat to its historical and legally enshrined water rights. Unilateral actions taken by both sides—including Ethiopia's successive reservoir fillings and Egypt's diplomatic escalations—have only exacerbated tensions, making GERD one of the most enduring disputes in African geopolitics.

Ethiopia launched GERD's construction in April 2011, without prior consultation with downstream nations, leading to immediate backlash from Egypt. At the time, Egypt was in the midst of political upheaval following the Arab Spring, which limited its ability to respond forcefully. Ethiopia justified the dam as a sovereign infrastructure project necessary for economic development and energy security. In response, Egypt insisted that Ethiopia's unilateral decision violated historical Nile water agreements, particularly the 1929 and 1959 treaties, which granted Egypt the majority share of the river's water and the right to veto upstream projects. Ethiopia rejected these treaties as colonial-era agreements that excluded upstream nations.

In an attempt to ease tensions, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan formed the International Panel of Experts (IPoE) in 2012 to assess GERD's impact. The panel's 2013 report highlighted significant gaps in Ethiopia's environmental and hydrological studies, recommending further analysis.

Ethiopia, however, proceeded with construction, dismissing Egypt's concerns as politically motivated.

A major breakthrough appeared in 2015 when Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan signed the Declaration of Principles (DoP) in Khartoum. This agreement acknowledged Ethiopia's right to develop GERD while committing all parties to cooperate on filling and operation in a way that avoids significant harm to downstream nations. However, the DoP did not establish specific water release guarantees or a binding enforcement mechanism, leaving key disagreements unresolved.

By 2018, GERD was nearing completion, and the focus of negotiations shifted to how Ethiopia would fill the dam's reservoir. Egypt insisted on a gradual filling process over 10–15 years to minimize disruptions to its water supply, while Ethiopia pushed for a 3–7 year timeline to accelerate its electricity generation. Sudan, initially aligned with Egypt, later shifted its stance as studies showed GERD could regulate water flow and prevent flooding.

The most serious breakdown occurred in 2019–2020, when the United States and the World Bank mediated talks in Washington, D.C. The negotiations resulted in a draft agreement that would have included drought mitigation measures and coordinated water management, but Ethiopia refused to sign the final document, arguing that it was biased toward Egypt's interests. In response, Egypt signed the agreement unilaterally and took the issue to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), seeking international pressure on Ethiopia. Ethiopia denounced Egypt's actions as an attempt to internationalize the dispute and asserted that GERD was a regional matter.

Despite these diplomatic maneuvers, Ethiopia proceeded unilaterally with the first filling of GERD in July 2020, during heavy rainfall. Egypt condemned this move as a violation of international norms but did not take direct retaliatory action beyond diplomatic protests.

Following GERD's partial completion in 2021, Ethiopia continued filling the reservoir without a binding agreement, further straining relations. Egypt and Sudan intensified diplomatic efforts, engaging with the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the Arab League, and the United Nations to mediate a resolution. However, Ethiopia maintained that any agreement must be a guiding framework, not a legally binding contract, further widening the gap between the parties.

Ethiopia's third filling in 2022 and the final filling phase in 2023, coinciding with GERD's first full electricity generation, further inflamed tensions. Egypt responded by mobilizing international allies, securing Arab League resolutions condemning Ethiopia's actions, and strengthening military ties with Sudan. Ethiopia, in turn, accused Egypt of attempting to block its development and warned that any military intervention would be met with retaliation.

In late 2023 and early 2024, new rounds of talks were held in Cairo, Addis Ababa, and Khartoum, but no significant progress was made. Egypt continued to demand a guaranteed minimum water release, particularly during drought years, while Ethiopia refused to cede sovereign control over GERD's operation. Sudan remained caught between the two positions, balancing its water interests with regional diplomatic considerations.

Both Egypt and Ethiopia have taken unilateral steps that have further complicated negotiations. Ethiopia's decision to fill GERD without an agreement has reinforced Egypt's perception that Addis Ababa is disregarding international norms. Meanwhile, Egypt has sought to internationalize the dispute, involving entities like the United Nations Security Council, the Arab League, and the United States, while also exploring alternative water sources such as desalination projects.

Additionally, Egypt has hinted at military action if its water security is threatened. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has repeatedly called the Nile a "red line", and the Egyptian military has conducted joint exercises with Sudan, signaling its readiness to defend its water rights if diplomacy fails. Ethiopia, in response, has bolstered regional alliances and emphasized its right to develop its natural resources without foreign interference.

GERD: Ethiopia's Role in 2025



Above: The intelligence dossier contained below.

Overview

This committee will begin in November, 2025. Rainfall in the summer months was lower than expected, leading to fears of an intense drought over the winter. Seeking to address domestic water security concerns, Ethiopian policy leaders decided to release less water than usual from the GERD. The National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia has procured the following **highly confidential informational memorandum for members of this committee. ANY SHARING OF THIS DOCUMENT WITH THE EGYPTIAN SIDE WILL BE CONSIDERED HIGH TREASON!**

Confidential Policy Memo

From: National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

To: Ethiopian Council of Ministers

Subject: Strategic Threats and Policy Recommendations Regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)

Date: [Insert Date]

Executive Summary

GERD is Ethiopia's most significant infrastructure project, promising energy security, economic development, and regional influence. However, Ethiopia faces critical threats not only from

Egypt's opposition but also from internal challenges, including the looming risk of drought, economic instability, and potential civil unrest. This memo assesses both external and internal threats and outlines policy recommendations to safeguard Ethiopia's national interests and ensure GERD's uninterrupted operation.

Threat Assessment

1. Looming Drought and Water Scarcity

- Climate models indicate a heightened risk of drought in Ethiopia in the coming year, which could lead to water shortages, food insecurity, and internal displacement. Drought conditions could fuel domestic discontent, strain government resources, and increase pressure from agricultural and industrial sectors dependent on water.

2. Egyptian Diplomatic Pressure and Legal Challenges

- Egypt continues to mobilize international institutions (UN Security Council, African Union, Arab League) to delegitimize Ethiopia's control over GERD. Egyptian efforts to push for a legally binding water-sharing agreement threaten Ethiopia's sovereignty over its water resources.

3. Economic and Financial Pressures

- Ethiopia's economic stability is threatened by both external financial pressures and internal economic weaknesses exacerbated by inflation and climate conditions. Egypt is working to limit international investments in GERD and Ethiopian hydropower infrastructure, pressuring Gulf states and Western partners to condition financial aid and trade agreements on Ethiopia's water policies.

4. Covert Cyber and Intelligence Threats

- Egypt is likely developing cyber capabilities aimed at disrupting GERD's operations, either through cyberattacks on Ethiopia's power grid or intelligence gathering to sabotage key infrastructure. Egyptian intelligence agencies may also seek to infiltrate Ethiopian institutions to create internal discord.

5. Support for Rebel Groups and Internal Destabilization

- Egyptian-backed elements may seek to destabilize Ethiopia's Benishangul-Gumuz region, where GERD is located, through insurgent activity. Additionally, worsening drought conditions could increase tensions among ethnic groups, exacerbating internal instability.

6. Potential Egyptian Military Action or Sabotage

- While direct military conflict remains unlikely, Egypt has engaged in provocative military exercises with Sudan near Ethiopia's borders, signaling a willingness to escalate. Possible sabotage scenarios include airstrikes on GERD, targeted drone

operations, or coordinated subversive actions by Egyptian-aligned actors.

Potential Policy Actions

1. Water Security and Drought Preparedness

- Expand water storage and irrigation projects to ensure national water security amid potential drought conditions. Develop a national drought response plan, integrating water conservation policies and emergency food security measures. Promote regional water-sharing agreements with Sudan and South Sudan to reduce external pressures and foster stability.

2. Diplomatic and Regional Strategies

- Enhance African Union (AU) and regional engagement: Frame GERD as an African-led success story, increasing diplomatic pressure on Egypt to respect African institutions rather than seek outside interference. Leverage Pan-African and Global South partnerships: Strengthen ties with China, Russia, Turkey, and the Gulf to counterbalance Egyptian influence. Engage Sudan constructively: Work towards long-term cooperation with Sudan on water-sharing agreements to neutralize Egyptian-Sudanese military cooperation.

3. Economic Leverage and Hydropower Expansion

- Accelerate regional energy exports to neighboring nations (Sudan, Kenya, Djibouti, South Sudan) to establish GERD as an essential economic asset for Africa. Offer hydropower supply agreements to Egypt under Ethiopian terms, forcing Cairo to choose between negotiation or continued isolation. Work with Chinese and Gulf investors to expand Ethiopia's infrastructure projects beyond GERD, reducing exposure to Egyptian diplomatic attacks.

4. Cybersecurity and Intelligence Operations

- Strengthen cyber defenses at GERD and other strategic infrastructure to preempt any Egyptian sabotage attempts. Deploy counterintelligence measures to detect and disrupt Egyptian espionage activities within Ethiopia. Develop offensive cyber capabilities as a deterrence measure, ensuring Ethiopia can retaliate against any Egyptian digital aggression.

5. Military and Security Preparedness

- Maintain high-alert status for Ethiopia's air defense systems around GERD. Conduct joint security drills with Sudan and South Sudan to reinforce military deterrence. Strengthen domestic intelligence operations to detect and dismantle foreign-backed insurgent threats in the Benishangul-Gumuz region.

6. Public and Media Engagement

- Launch a global media campaign positioning GERD as a driver of regional prosperity rather than a threat to Egypt. Counteract Egyptian narratives by

promoting Ethiopia's legal and moral rights over Nile waters through African and international platforms. Foster domestic unity by ensuring Ethiopian citizens are informed about GERD's national significance and the external and internal threats it faces.

Conclusion

GERD is a cornerstone of Ethiopia's economic future, and its protection from both external aggression and internal vulnerabilities must be a national priority. Ethiopia should pursue a multi-dimensional approach by strengthening water security, diplomatic alliances, economic independence, military readiness, and cybersecurity. NISS recommends a firm yet pragmatic stance, ensuring Ethiopia's sovereignty remains non-negotiable while allowing for strategic engagement when beneficial.

Prepared by:

Rude Jeece

Deputy of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS)

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Additional Committee Information

Preferences of the Dais

- Do **not** prewrite any resolutions, amendments, or other materials before the first committee session.
- Conduct all **committee work within committee time and spaces** to ensure equitable access to policymaking for all parties involved. You are free to get lunch or otherwise coordinate with other delegates to talk strategy, but once again, you cannot write anything that will be used in committee outside of the committee room under any circumstances.
- **VERY IMPORTANT FOR AWARDS PLACEMENTS:** Be respectful to your fellow delegates and the activity of Model United Nations as a whole. This is a diplomacy simulation—not a bullying competition. If you use your time in unmods to pressure or intimidate other delegates into cooperating with you, this will reflect poorly on you in awards. We instead encourage you to get to know the people that you are working with in your voting blocs, incorporate ideas on an equal basis, and genuinely collaborate. We give no special preferences for whoever is the “first sponsor” or staples their own clauses/paper on top of a merged directive. What matters to us is that you are engaging with the committee and submitting your own innovative ideas to solve the crisis at hand. If you feel that you are being purposefully excluded from conversations, let your chair know. This ethos extends to structured debate (unmods, round robins, etc.), where we expect you listen attentively to your fellow delegates.

Notes on Procedure

- We understand that as a crisis committee, which is less common in high school Model United Nations, some delegates may need additional procedural assistance or reminders. We will review relevant crisis parliamentary procedure at the beginning of the first committee, but do not hesitate to tell us (e.g. passing a note) if you need a moment to catch up on procedure!
- Accordingly, to the more experienced delegates of the committee: be ready and willing to assist your less experienced peers with procedure! The chairs will look favorably upon being a team player! :)

Delegate Dossiers

Below, we have provided brief, non-exhaustive descriptions of the powers that each delegate has as a result of the offices they hold along with a recommendation of what those powers might be used for in the event of a crisis surrounding the GERD. We once again strongly encourage delegates to think outside of the box and introduce frontroom policy solutions and formulate backroom character arcs that demonstrate creativity and research beyond the information included below. Remember: in frontroom, your goal is to secure Ethiopian stability and power in the face of uncertainty posed by the GERD and the Egyptian side of the JCC. In backroom, your goal is to grow your character's powers and advance your personal strategic interests relative to your counterparts in committee and in the Egyptian committee—the suggestions of what your character might do in the crisis are just suggestions based on your initial powers, make sure you grow them over the course of the conference!

1. Seleshi Bekele: Chief Negotiator and Advisor on Transboundary Rivers and GERD

- a. Seleshi Bekele plays a central role in Ethiopia's diplomatic strategy on GERD, leading negotiations with Egypt and Sudan regarding water allocation and dam operations. Amongst other actions, he can help to ensure that Ethiopia's legal and technical arguments align with international water-sharing principles to justify GERD's operation. In a crisis, he may be at the forefront of defusing tensions, advocating for Ethiopia's rights, and working with regional and global mediators to prevent escalation.

2. Gedion Timotheos: Minister of Foreign Affairs

- a. Gedion Timotheos leads Ethiopia's diplomatic engagement, shaping international narratives to justify Ethiopia's position on GERD. He, along with other delegates, can rally African Union support and counter international pressure from Egypt and its allies. In a crisis, he may engage in diplomatic damage control, ensuring Ethiopia's interests are represented at the UN and other global forums.

3. Aisha Mohammed Mussa: Minister of Defense, Board Member of EEP

- a. As Minister of Defense, Aisha Mohammed Mussa is responsible for Ethiopia's military preparedness, including protecting GERD from potential threats. Her role on the Ethiopian Electric Power board connects her directly to GERD's energy production, ensuring the dam's completion aligns with national security interests. In a crisis, she could oversee military strategies to safeguard Ethiopia's water security, including troop deployments near the dam and defensive coordination with Sudan.

4. Ahmed Shide: Minister of Finance

- a. Ahmed Shide ensures financial stability and funding for GERD, managing domestic

and international investments in Ethiopia's energy sector. He can secure alternative financial partnerships if external pressures attempt to disrupt GERD's funding. In a crisis, he could oversee emergency economic measures to protect Ethiopia's financial system from potential sanctions or economic retaliation.

5. Hanna Arayaselassie: Minister of Justice

- a. Hanna Arayaselassie is responsible for defending Ethiopia's legal stance on GERD in international courts and legal forums, amongst other responsibilities. She ensures Ethiopia's compliance with both domestic and international laws concerning transboundary water use. In a crisis, she might lead Ethiopia's legal response to potential lawsuits or UN interventions initiated by Egypt.

6. Belete Molla: Minister of Innovation and Technology

- a. Belete Molla oversees Ethiopia's technological advancements, including innovations in hydropower infrastructure related to GERD. He is responsible for developing digital monitoring systems to ensure the dam's operations remain transparent and efficient. During a crisis, he might work on technological innovations for water management and counter cyber threats targeting GERD's infrastructure.

7. Kassahun Gode: Minister of Trade and Regional Integration

- a. Kassahun Gode manages Ethiopia's trade policies and economic integration, ensuring that GERD supports national and regional development. He can negotiate trade agreements with neighboring countries to leverage Ethiopia's growing energy export capacity. In a crisis, he could implement trade restrictions or incentives to counteract economic pressure from Egypt or its allies.

8. Ergoge Tesfaye: Minister of Women and Social Affairs

- a. Ergoge Tesfaye is responsible for ensuring that GERD benefits Ethiopia's social and economic development, particularly for women and rural communities. She oversees programs aimed at supporting communities affected by GERD-related developments, such as resettlement and job creation. In a crisis, she could work to manage domestic unrest by addressing social grievances linked to GERD's impact on local populations.

9. Habtamu Itefa: Minister of Water and Energy

- a. Habtamu Itefa oversees Ethiopia's water resource management and energy distribution, ensuring GERD maximizes national benefits. He is responsible for maintaining Ethiopia's energy self-sufficiency while negotiating water-sharing agreements with regional partners. In a crisis, he might implement emergency water and energy distribution plans to counteract external pressures or disruptions.

10. Oumer Hussein: Minister of Agriculture

- a. Oumer Hussein ensures Ethiopia's agricultural sector can adapt to any changes in

water flow resulting from GERD's operations. He oversees policies that balance irrigation needs with hydropower production, minimizing potential disputes with downstream nations. In a crisis, he might implement contingency measures to prevent food insecurity caused by potential Egyptian countermeasures.

11. Mufeirat Kamil Ahmed: Minister of Labor and Skills Development

- a. Mufeirat Kamil Ahmed oversees workforce development programs related to GERD's construction and long-term operational needs. She is responsible for ensuring job creation from GERD contributes to national economic growth. In a crisis, she might coordinate economic relief programs for workers and communities affected by GERD-related tensions.

12. Abreham Belay: CEO of Ethiopian Electric Power, Minister of Irrigation and Lowland Areas Development

- a. Abreham Belay is responsible for the operational success of GERD, ensuring efficient energy generation and infrastructure management. As Minister of Irrigation, he oversees Ethiopia's water distribution policies, balancing hydropower needs with agricultural demands. During a crisis, he might expedite GERD's energy output adjustments or implement emergency measures to protect the dam from external threats.

13. Ashadli Hassan: Chief Administrator of the Benishangul-Gumuz Region

- a. Ashadli Hassan governs the region where GERD is located, ensuring local security and stability. He is responsible for preventing conflicts between local communities and the national government over GERD's impact. In a crisis, he might coordinate security forces to protect GERD from potential sabotage or unrest.

14. Temesgen Tiruneh: Director General of the National Intelligence and Security Service

- a. Temesgen Tiruneh oversees Ethiopia's intelligence operations, monitoring external and internal threats related to GERD. He is responsible for countering espionage and misinformation campaigns targeting Ethiopia's water policies. In a crisis, he might lead covert operations to ensure national security against threats from foreign actors.

15. Birhanu Jula Gelalcha: Chief of General Staff of the Ethiopian National Defense Force

- a. Birhanu Jula Gelalcha commands Ethiopia's military forces, ensuring national security against potential threats to GERD. He oversees strategic military planning, including defense measures for critical infrastructure like GERD. In a crisis, he might mobilize military forces to safeguard Ethiopia's water interests against external aggression.

16. Demelash Gebremichael: Commissioner General of the Ethiopian Federal Police

- a. Demelash Gebremichael ensures domestic security and law enforcement coordination in response to GERD-related tensions. He is responsible for

preventing domestic unrest and maintaining stability in key urban and rural areas. In a crisis, he might deploy security forces to protect GERD and respond to protests or civil disturbances.

17. Hassen Ebrahim Mussa: Ethiopian Ambassador to Egypt

- a. Hassen Ebrahim Mussa represents Ethiopia's interests in Egypt, managing diplomatic engagements related to GERD. He is responsible for reducing tensions and facilitating dialogue between Ethiopian and Egyptian officials. During a crisis, he might work to de-escalate hostilities and promote backchannel negotiations to prevent open conflict.

18. Tesfaye Yilma: Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations

- a. Tesfaye Yilma advocates for Ethiopia's position on GERD at the UN, countering diplomatic pressures from Egypt. He ensures Ethiopia's sovereignty over GERD remains internationally recognized. In a crisis, he might lobby against UN resolutions unfavorable to Ethiopia and rally support from allied nations.

19. Hirut Zemene: Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the African Union and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

- a. Hirut Zemene leads Ethiopia's diplomatic efforts within the African Union, framing GERD as an African development success story. She is responsible for securing AU support and mediating regional disputes related to Nile water usage. During a crisis, she might work to block Egypt's attempts to involve external powers in GERD-related disputes, keeping negotiations within Africa.