



# DUMUNC

XL

## Background Guide

Joint Crisis Committee: The Grand Ethiopian  
Renaissance Dam

*Arab Republic of Egypt*



*Chairs*

Charlie Warren and Suhhyun Lee

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*Above: The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in August 2024*

# *Letter from the Dais*

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to DUMUNC XL! We're elated to have you here! Whether you're a longtime Model United Nations enthusiast or a newcomer to this exciting extracurricular event, we hope this committee will be productive, compelling, and (most importantly) fun for all involved!

The problems you will tackle and the crises that will arise over the course of the weekend will require out-of-the-box thinking and creative problem solving on your behalf. We hope all the delegates can work together to create these innovative solutions. Most of all, we want you all to relax and enjoy this weekend while learning a lot about the art of diplomacy, water security, and the fascinating geopolitical dynamics surrounding the Nile river!

As your chairs, we hope to make this committee fun and memorable for everyone. We will work hard to make sure that everyone's voices are heard in both moderated and unmoderated debate. If any problems arise over the course of the committee, or if you have questions about DUMUNC or Duke in general feel free to ask at any time during the course of the conference. Good luck to you all and we hope you have a lot of fun this weekend!

Sincerely,

Charlie Warren and Suhhyun Lee

*Chairs, GERD Egypt*

## *Expectations for Debate*

### *Delegate Conduct*

While we expect to see lots of spirited debate over the course of the weekend, we expect that delegates conduct themselves with civility at all times. Any violations of the DUMUNC Code of Conduct will result in automatic disqualification from awards considerations. Please contact your chairs or a member of DUMUNC staff either privately in-person or via our anonymous reporting form if you have concerns relating to delegate conduct. Aside from that, we will be watching you closely to observe how you work together with your fellow delegates, advocate for your beliefs, and advance your character in the backroom to determine award placements.

### *Committee Structure*

**This is a joint crisis committee**, which involves parliamentary procedures and delegate actions not present in general assembly or specialized bodies. In addition to advocating for their character's and country's interests during moderated and unmoderated caucuses as typical in most Model UN bodies, delegates will be expected to write **crisis notes**. Crisis notes are private notes written **in-character** that are designed to advance your own interests hidden from the public eye. We will review how this process works for all those unfamiliar with crisis committees at the beginning of the first committee session. If at any point you do not know what is happening or how to do something, **please let your chair know**—we are here to help!

### *Course of the Crisis*

The crisis chairs and crisis staff for JCC: GERD have outlined a few initial crises that the delegates of both countries will face surrounding the GERD (see the “GERD: Egypt’s Role” section for more), but after that, we are very open to take the joint committees in whatever direction the delegates steer them in. We would highly encourage both sides of the committee to communicate with one another frequently in public or in private, in the context of peace or in the context of conflict (armed or otherwise). This said, our primary restriction is that we will not allow both sides to engage in warfare early in the committee. We want to see both sides attempt **IN GOOD FAITH** to come up with mutually beneficial negotiated settlements or some other way of ensuring their well-being short of a costly and deadly armed conflict. Of course, there are other ways to interfere with the other side outside of armed conflict too, which we encourage delegates to explore to the fullest extent possible through frontroom or in backroom arcs.

## *Introduction*

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is one of Africa's most ambitious infrastructure projects. Located on the Blue Nile River in Ethiopia's Benishangul-Gumuz region, the dam is designed to generate hydroelectric power and drive economic development. However, GERD has also been at the center of geopolitical tensions between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan. Understanding the historical background of the GERD requires an exploration of Ethiopia's hydropower ambitions, colonial-era treaties, and the project's evolution over time.

Ethiopia has long sought to harness its vast water resources for economic growth. With an estimated hydropower potential of over 45,000 megawatts, the country has faced challenges in utilizing this capacity due to financial constraints and regional political considerations (International Energy Agency, 2019). Since the mid-20th century, Ethiopian leaders have envisioned major dam projects on the Blue Nile, the river contributing about 85% of the Nile's flow. With the GERD's completion in 2023, Ethiopia finally realized this initial vision, but several problems loom on the horizon, with relations with our downstream neighbors casting the longest shadow...

Delegates in this committee must be prepared to navigate the complex diplomatic considerations surrounding the GERD, particularly as they relate to our sister committee—GERD: Egypt. How should Ethiopia approach relations with Egypt in light of their distaste for the GERD? What role should other states on the Nile rivers, other regional powers in Africa, and great powers outside of Africa play in the resolution of GERD-related affairs? How should we respond to various crises that arise in relation to the GERD? As that last question implies, delegates should be prepared to respond quickly to news reports related to delegate- and news-driven actions. These questions and others will form the agenda of DUMUNC XL's GERD JCC committees.

## ***Historical Background***

### ***Overview:***

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has been a focal point of geopolitical tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia, with Sudan also playing a significant role. At the heart of the dispute is the Nile River, a critical water source for all three nations. Egypt, heavily dependent on the Nile for its water supply, views GERD as a potential existential threat. Ethiopia, on the other hand, considers the dam essential for its economic development and energy security. The conflict over GERD is rooted in a complex history of colonial-era treaties, regional power dynamics, and competing national interests.

### ***20th Century Treaties and Water Rights:***

The first formal agreement related to Nile water rights between Ethiopia and colonial powers was the 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty, signed between Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia and Britain (representing Sudan). The treaty stipulated that Ethiopia would not undertake projects on the Blue Nile, Lake Tana, or the Sobat River that would significantly alter the river's flow without British consent. Ethiopia later disputed the treaty's interpretation, arguing that it was signed under colonial coercion and does not bind a sovereign Ethiopia today.

The 1929 Nile Waters Agreement between Britain (on behalf of Egypt and Sudan) and Egypt granted Egypt the majority of the Nile's water allocation and gave it veto power over upstream projects. Ethiopia, which was not a party to the agreement, rejected its legitimacy, viewing it as an imposition of colonial-era hegemony.

The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement in 1959 between Egypt and Sudan further entrenched Egypt's dominance over the Nile. This treaty allocated 55.5 billion cubic meters of Nile water annually to Egypt and 18.5 billion cubic meters to Sudan, with no provisions for Ethiopia or other upstream states. Ethiopia has consistently rejected this agreement, arguing that it was signed without its participation and denies its rights to Nile water utilization.

These old negotiations have sown present-day mistrust between Ethiopia and Egypt when negotiating over GERD-related affairs. But why did Ethiopia build the GERD in the first place?

### ***Ethiopia's Hydroelectric Ambitions and Rationale for Constructing the GERD***

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is one of Africa's most ambitious infrastructure

projects, reflecting Ethiopia's strategic vision for economic development, energy security, and regional influence. Since its initial introduction in 2010 by Ethiopian officials, GERD was intended to address Ethiopia's chronic electricity shortages, support industrialization, and assert the country's rightful share of Nile water resources. Ethiopia's motivations for building GERD stem from a combination of economic necessity, national pride, and geopolitical considerations, all of which underscore the dam's central role in the country's long-term development strategy.

A primary reason for Ethiopia's pursuit of GERD is the urgent need to address its energy deficit. Despite being one of the fastest-growing economies in Africa, Ethiopia has long suffered from unreliable electricity access, with nearly half of its population lacking consistent power. The GERD, with its planned capacity of 6,450 megawatts, will more than double Ethiopia's energy production, significantly improving electrification rates and supporting industrial expansion. Reliable and affordable electricity is essential for Ethiopia's efforts to transition toward an industrialized economy, attracting both domestic and foreign investments in energy-intensive sectors such as manufacturing, mining, and agro-processing. Additionally, the availability of surplus electricity enables Ethiopia to position itself as a regional energy hub, with plans to export power to neighboring countries such as Sudan, Kenya, and Djibouti, generating much-needed foreign exchange revenue.

Beyond energy security, GERD is a crucial tool for water resource management, allowing Ethiopia to better regulate the seasonal variability of the Blue Nile. Historically, Ethiopia has contributed over 85% of the Nile's water through the Blue Nile, yet it has lacked significant reservoirs to store and utilize this critical resource. By constructing a reservoir with a capacity of 74 billion cubic meters, Ethiopia can manage water flow more efficiently, reducing seasonal fluctuations and mitigating both droughts and floods. This controlled release of water will not only benefit Ethiopia but also help Sudan by preventing destructive flooding, stabilizing agricultural irrigation, and improving hydroelectric generation at Sudanese dams. In contrast, Egypt has voiced concerns that GERD could reduce its water supply, although Ethiopia insists that careful coordination of water releases will prevent any adverse downstream effects.

The dam also carries significant symbolic and political weight within Ethiopia. Funded largely through domestic sources, including public bond sales and government contributions, GERD represents a statement of national self-reliance and resilience. Ethiopia has historically been marginalized in Nile water agreements, particularly the 1929 and 1959 treaties that allocated the majority of the river's waters to Egypt and Sudan, effectively excluding Ethiopia from meaningful utilization of its own resources. The GERD, therefore, serves as a direct challenge to these colonial-era agreements, positioning Ethiopia as an assertive player in regional water politics. Domestically, the dam has been used to rally national unity, especially in times of political turbulence, with successive Ethiopian administrations presenting it as a unifying project that

transcends ethnic and political divisions.

Moreover, GERD is expected to have significant economic spillover effects beyond electricity production. The construction of the dam has created tens of thousands of jobs, stimulating various sectors such as construction, logistics, and infrastructure development. The dam will also provide crucial support for Ethiopia's agriculture sector by ensuring more consistent water availability, reducing soil erosion, and improving irrigation systems. These improvements are particularly important for Ethiopia's long-term food security goals, as well as for stabilizing the livelihoods of millions of smallholder farmers who depend on predictable water access for their crops.

### ***Egypt's Concerns: Reasons for Opposing the GERD***

While the GERD holds the potential to transform Ethiopia's energy sector and economic prospects, it has the potential to ruin those of its downstream neighbors—most notably Egypt. For Egypt, a country that relies on the Nile River for nearly 97% of its freshwater needs, the dam represents an existential threat to its water security, agricultural stability, and overall national security. Egypt's concerns over GERD stem from fears of reduced water availability, economic and environmental consequences, and the potential for regional instability, all of which have intensified diplomatic tensions between the two nations.

One of Egypt's primary concerns is the impact of GERD on its water supply. Egypt is heavily dependent on the Nile River, particularly the Blue Nile, which contributes about 60-70% of the total Nile flow. Historically, Egypt has been protected by the 1929 and 1959 Nile Water Agreements, which granted it the majority of the river's water—55.5 billion cubic meters (BCM) annually, while Sudan received 18.5 BCM. These agreements, however, excluded upstream countries like Ethiopia from significant water utilization. With GERD's massive reservoir—74 BCM, nearly equivalent to Egypt's total annual allocation—Egypt fears that the dam's filling process and long-term operation could reduce the volume of water flowing into the Aswan High Dam, which is essential for its water storage and hydroelectric generation. A rapid filling of GERD, particularly during years of drought, could leave Egypt vulnerable to severe water shortages.

Egypt's second major concern relates to agriculture and food security, both of which are directly linked to the Nile's water supply. Approximately 95% of Egypt's cultivated land depends on irrigation from the Nile, and any reduction in water availability could have catastrophic consequences for Egyptian farmers. A decrease in Nile water levels could lead to lower agricultural yields, increased desertification, and heightened food insecurity for Egypt's growing population of over 100 million people. The Nile Delta, one of the most fertile agricultural regions in the world, is particularly at risk, as reduced river flow could exacerbate saltwater intrusion from



the Mediterranean Sea, making farmland unusable. This, in turn, could increase food imports, raise commodity prices, and place further strain on Egypt's economy.

Beyond water scarcity and agricultural impacts, GERD also raises economic and hydropower concerns for Egypt. The Aswan High Dam, built in the 1960s, is crucial for hydroelectric power generation and flood control in Egypt. A reduction in upstream water flow due to GERD could limit Egypt's ability to generate hydropower, increasing dependence on fossil fuels and raising energy costs for both industry and households. Additionally, fluctuations in water flow caused by GERD's operations could disrupt navigation in the Nile, affecting industries and the movement of goods. Given that Egypt's economy is already strained by high unemployment, foreign debt, and inflation, any disruption to water access or agricultural production could destabilize the country's economic foundation.

The geopolitical implications of GERD further exacerbate Egypt's concerns. Egypt has long viewed itself as the dominant power in the Nile Basin, and its historical treaties granted it a privileged position in managing Nile water resources. However, Ethiopia's decision to construct GERD without prior approval from Egypt represents a fundamental shift in regional power dynamics. The dam challenges Egypt's historical dominance and weakens its ability to dictate Nile water policies. Egyptian officials worry that GERD could set a precedent for other upstream nations—such as Uganda, Kenya, and South Sudan—to construct their own large-scale water projects, further reducing Egypt's control over the Nile. Egypt also fears that Sudan, which initially expressed concerns about GERD but later showed support for the project, could shift its alliances away from Cairo and towards Addis Ababa, altering regional strategic balances.

Egypt's frustrations are further fueled by Ethiopia's unilateral approach to filling GERD's reservoir. Despite years of negotiations, Ethiopia has proceeded with multiple filling phases without reaching a legally binding agreement on coordinated water management and dispute resolution mechanisms. Egypt, along with Sudan, has repeatedly pushed for a legally enforceable deal that ensures minimum guaranteed water flows and mechanisms for handling drought years. Ethiopia, however, has resisted external pressure, arguing that GERD is a sovereign project that does not require Egyptian approval. This diplomatic deadlock has led Egypt to escalate its concerns to the United Nations, the African Union, and the Arab League, seeking international intervention to secure its water rights.

The possibility of regional instability due to GERD also looms large over Egypt's security concerns. Egyptian officials have repeatedly described the Nile as a "red line" and have not ruled out military action if they perceive GERD as an imminent threat to national survival. Egypt has strengthened military ties with Sudan and conducted joint military exercises, signaling that it is prepared to defend its water rights by force if necessary. While direct military confrontation remains unlikely, the risk of heightened regional tensions, proxy conflicts, or sabotage efforts

remains a pressing concern. GERD has already exacerbated divisions between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan, raising the specter of long-term geopolitical instability in the Horn of Africa and the broader Nile Basin.

In sum, Egypt's opposition to GERD is driven by deep-seated fears over water security, agricultural sustainability, economic stability, and geopolitical influence. The Nile is not just a river for Egypt—it is the country's lifeline, and any perceived threat to its flow is regarded as a direct challenge to national survival. While Ethiopia views GERD as a symbol of economic progress, Egypt sees it as a potential catastrophe that could destabilize its fragile water-dependent economy. The failure to reach a binding agreement on GERD's operation has only deepened tensions, making water diplomacy between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan one of the most pressing geopolitical issues in Africa today. Whether through negotiations, legal mechanisms, or international mediation, Egypt remains committed to ensuring that its access to the Nile remains protected, predictable, and sustainable for generations to come.

### ***Previous Egyptian-Ethiopian GERD Negotiations***

Since Ethiopia's announcement of the project in 2011, Egypt and Ethiopia have engaged in multiple rounds of negotiations, often mediated by international actors, in an attempt to resolve their differences over the dam's impact on the Nile River. Despite decades of diplomatic talks, high-level summits, and third-party interventions, the two nations have failed to reach a legally binding agreement on the operation and filling of GERD. Ethiopia has repeatedly asserted its right to develop its water resources without external interference, while Egypt has viewed the dam as an existential threat to its historical and legally enshrined water rights. Unilateral actions taken by both sides—including Ethiopia's successive reservoir fillings and Egypt's diplomatic escalations—have only exacerbated tensions, making GERD one of the most enduring disputes in African geopolitics.

Ethiopia launched GERD's construction in April 2011, without prior consultation with downstream nations, leading to immediate backlash from Egypt. At the time, Egypt was in the midst of political upheaval following the Arab Spring, which limited its ability to respond forcefully. Ethiopia justified the dam as a sovereign infrastructure project necessary for economic development and energy security. In response, Egypt insisted that Ethiopia's unilateral decision violated historical Nile water agreements, particularly the 1929 and 1959 treaties, which granted Egypt the majority share of the river's water and the right to veto upstream projects. Ethiopia rejected these treaties as colonial-era agreements that excluded upstream nations.

In an attempt to ease tensions, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan formed the International Panel of Experts (IPoE) in 2012 to assess GERD's impact. The panel's 2013 report highlighted significant gaps in Ethiopia's environmental and hydrological studies, recommending further analysis.

Ethiopia, however, proceeded with construction, dismissing Egypt's concerns as politically motivated.

A major breakthrough appeared in 2015 when Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan signed the Declaration of Principles (DoP) in Khartoum. This agreement acknowledged Ethiopia's right to develop GERD while committing all parties to cooperate on filling and operation in a way that avoids significant harm to downstream nations. However, the DoP did not establish specific water release guarantees or a binding enforcement mechanism, leaving key disagreements unresolved.

By 2018, GERD was nearing completion, and the focus of negotiations shifted to how Ethiopia would fill the dam's reservoir. Egypt insisted on a gradual filling process over 10–15 years to minimize disruptions to its water supply, while Ethiopia pushed for a 3–7 year timeline to accelerate its electricity generation. Sudan, initially aligned with Egypt, later shifted its stance as studies showed GERD could regulate water flow and prevent flooding.

The most serious breakdown occurred in 2019–2020, when the United States and the World Bank mediated talks in Washington, D.C. The negotiations resulted in a draft agreement that would have included drought mitigation measures and coordinated water management, but Ethiopia refused to sign the final document, arguing that it was biased toward Egypt's interests. In response, Egypt signed the agreement unilaterally and took the issue to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), seeking international pressure on Ethiopia. Ethiopia denounced Egypt's actions as an attempt to internationalize the dispute and asserted that GERD was a regional matter.

Despite these diplomatic maneuvers, Ethiopia proceeded unilaterally with the first filling of GERD in July 2020, during heavy rainfall. Egypt condemned this move as a violation of international norms but did not take direct retaliatory action beyond diplomatic protests.

Following GERD's partial completion in 2021, Ethiopia continued filling the reservoir without a binding agreement, further straining relations. Egypt and Sudan intensified diplomatic efforts, engaging with the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the Arab League, and the United Nations to mediate a resolution. However, Ethiopia maintained that any agreement must be a guiding framework, not a legally binding contract, further widening the gap between the parties.

Ethiopia's third filling in 2022 and the final filling phase in 2023, coinciding with GERD's first full electricity generation, further inflamed tensions. Egypt responded by mobilizing international allies, securing Arab League resolutions condemning Ethiopia's actions, and strengthening military ties with Sudan. Ethiopia, in turn, accused Egypt of attempting to block its development and warned that any military intervention would be met with retaliation.

In late 2023 and early 2024, new rounds of talks were held in Cairo, Addis Ababa, and Khartoum, but no significant progress was made. Egypt continued to demand a guaranteed minimum water release, particularly during drought years, while Ethiopia refused to cede sovereign control over GERD's operation. Sudan remained caught between the two positions, balancing its water interests with regional diplomatic considerations.

Both Egypt and Ethiopia have taken unilateral steps that have further complicated negotiations. Ethiopia's decision to fill GERD without an agreement has reinforced Egypt's perception that Addis Ababa is disregarding international norms. Meanwhile, Egypt has sought to internationalize the dispute, involving entities like the United Nations Security Council, the Arab League, and the United States, while also exploring alternative water sources such as desalination projects.

Additionally, Egypt has hinted at military action if its water security is threatened. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has repeatedly called the Nile a "red line", and the Egyptian military has conducted joint exercises with Sudan, signaling its readiness to defend its water rights if diplomacy fails. Ethiopia, in response, has bolstered regional alliances and emphasized its right to develop its natural resources without foreign interference.

## GERD: Egypt's Role in 2025



*Above: The intelligence dossier contained below.*

### Overview

**This committee will begin in November, 2025.** Rainfall in the summer months was lower than expected, leading to fears of an intense drought over the winter. Seeking to address domestic water security concerns, Ethiopian policy leaders decided to release less water than usual from the GERD. The General Intelligence Service (GIS) of the Arab Republic of Egypt has procured the following **highly confidential informational memorandum for members of this committee.** **ANY SHARING OF THIS DOCUMENT WITH THE ETHIOPIAN SIDE WILL BE CONSIDERED HIGH TREASON!**

### Confidential Policy Memo

**From:** General Intelligence Service (GIS), Arab Republic of Egypt

**To:** Egyptian Cabinet

**Subject:** Strategic Threats and Policy Recommendations Regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)

**Date:** [Insert Date]

### Executive Summary

The GERD represents an ongoing strategic threat to Egypt's water security, economic stability, and regional influence. Recent developments, including unilateral Ethiopian actions and increasing regional instability, necessitate an Egyptian response. This memo outlines critical

threats posed by GERD and provides recommendations to safeguard Egypt's national interests.

## **Threat Assessment**

1. **Extreme Drought and Water Release Disputes:** Ethiopia's refusal to commit to binding agreements on GERD's operation risks severe water shortages for Egypt, particularly in drought years. An Ethiopian decision to withhold water during a crisis could lead to significant agricultural losses and domestic unrest in Egypt.
  - **Recommended Action:** Increase diplomatic pressure through international legal mechanisms (e.g., the UN Security Council) while strengthening domestic water conservation and desalination efforts.
2. **Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities and Infrastructure Threats**
  - GERD's control systems present a potential target for cyber warfare. A cyberattack, whether state-sponsored or from non-state actors, could disrupt GERD's operations, triggering regional instability. Ethiopia's likely response would be to escalate military preparedness and further limit transparency around GERD's operations.
3. **Insurgency and Internal Unrest in Ethiopia**
  - Ethiopia's Benishangul-Gumuz region (where GERD is located) remains volatile, with rebel factions capable of disrupting GERD operations. Ethiopian officials have previously accused foreign actors, including Egypt, of supporting these groups.
4. **Structural Vulnerabilities and Accidental Dam Failure**
  - GERD's long-term structural integrity remains uncertain, and an unexpected collapse or partial failure could cause catastrophic flooding in Sudan while severely damaging Ethiopia's energy grid. Such an event would shift global discourse, casting Ethiopia as negligent and forcing it to allow external oversight of GERD operations.
5. **Egyptian Military Posturing and Strategic Deterrence**
  - Recent Ethiopian military movements around GERD suggest an increased readiness to defend the dam from external threats. Simultaneously, Egyptian military exercises along the Sudanese border are viewed by Ethiopia as a sign of potential escalation. Any miscalculation could result in an unintended military clash, further polarizing international support.

## **Possible Policy Actions at This Time**

1. **Diplomatic and Legal Engagement**
  - Push for a **binding water-sharing agreement** through the **UN Security Council**, **African Union (AU)**, and **Arab League**. Leverage European and Gulf allies to

condition financial support to Ethiopia on cooperative GERD policies. Expand Egyptian public diplomacy efforts to frame Ethiopia's actions as a **threat to regional stability and humanitarian security**.

## 2. **Regional Alliances and Strategic Partnerships**

- Strengthen military and intelligence ties with **Sudan, South Sudan, and Gulf states** to counterbalance Ethiopian influence. Increase economic and infrastructure cooperation with Nile Basin countries to undermine Ethiopian regional dominance. Utilize **Israeli and Turkish influence** in Ethiopia to mediate negotiations or apply indirect pressure.

## 3. **Covert Operations and Cyber Capabilities**

- Expand **cyber reconnaissance and sabotage capabilities** targeting Ethiopian water management and energy grids. Consider clandestine operations to delay Ethiopia's full control over GERD's output. Support **proxy actors** within Ethiopia to create internal political and security distractions that slow GERD-related policies.

## 4. **Economic Leverage and Nile Water Alternatives**

- Accelerate domestic investments in **desalination plants, water recycling programs, and efficient irrigation technologies**. Encourage Gulf states and Chinese investors to **diversify their hydropower investments away from GERD** and into alternative projects aligned with Egypt's interests. Explore water import agreements with **Sudan and Libya** to reduce dependency on the Nile.

## **Conclusion**

The GERD dispute is entering a critical phase that could define the regional balance of power for decades. While military options remain a last resort, Egypt must pursue a multi-pronged strategy combining diplomatic pressure, cyber operations, regional alliances, and economic deterrence to mitigate GERD's threat. GIS recommends that Egypt adopt a decisive but flexible approach, ensuring that all available tools—both overt and covert—are leveraged to protect our vital national interests.

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### **Prepared by:**

Warlie Charren

General Intelligence Service Deputy

Arab Republic of Egypt

## *Additional Committee Information*

### *Preferences of the Dais*

- Do **not** prewrite any resolutions, amendments, or other materials before the first committee session.
- Conduct all **committee work within committee time and spaces** to ensure equitable access to policymaking for all parties involved. You are free to get lunch or otherwise coordinate with other delegates to talk strategy, but once again, you cannot write anything that will be used in committee outside of the committee room under any circumstances.
- **VERY IMPORTANT FOR AWARDS PLACEMENTS:** Be respectful to your fellow delegates and the activity of Model United Nations as a whole. This is a *diplomacy* simulation—not a bullying competition. If you use your time in unmods to pressure or intimidate other delegates into cooperating with you, this will reflect poorly on you in awards. We instead encourage you to get to know the people that you are working with in your voting blocs, incorporate ideas on an equal basis, and genuinely collaborate. We give no special preferences for whoever is the “first sponsor” or staples their own clauses/paper on top of a merged directive. What matters to us is that you are engaging with the committee and submitting your own innovative ideas to solve the crisis at hand. If you feel that you are being purposefully excluded from conversations, let your chair know. This extends to structured debate (unmods, round robins, etc.): please listen attentively to your fellow delegates.

### *Notes on Procedure*

- We understand that as a crisis committee, which is less common in high school Model United Nations, some delegates may need additional procedural assistance or reminders. We will review relevant crisis parliamentary procedure at the beginning of the first committee, but do not hesitate to tell us (e.g. passing a note) if you need a moment to catch up on procedure!
- Accordingly, to the more experienced delegates of the committee: be ready and willing to assist your less experienced peers with procedure! The chairs will look favorably upon being a team player! :)



## *Delegate Dossiers*

Below, we have provided brief, non-exhaustive descriptions of the powers that each delegate has as a result of the offices they hold along with a recommendation of what those powers might be used for in the event of a crisis surrounding the GERD. We once again strongly encourage delegates to think outside of the box and introduce frontroom policy solutions and formulate backroom character arcs that demonstrate creativity and research beyond the information included below. Remember: in frontroom, your goal is to secure Egyptian stability and power in the face of uncertainty posed by the GERD and the Ethiopian side of the JCC. In backroom, your goal is to grow your character's powers and advance your personal strategic interests relative to your counterparts in committee and in the Ethiopian committee—the suggestions of what your character might do in the crisis are just suggestions based on your initial powers, make sure you grow them over the course of the conference!

### **1. Kamel al-Wazir: Minister of Transportation and Minister of Industry**

- a. As Minister of Transportation, Kamel al-Wazir oversees Egypt's logistical infrastructure, ensuring the movement of goods and personnel, which could be crucial in a crisis involving the GERD. His role as Minister of Industry involves safeguarding Egyptian industrial sectors that rely on Nile water for production, potentially leading to strategic economic adjustments if water shortages occur. In the event of escalated tensions with Ethiopia, he may be responsible for facilitating military or humanitarian logistics, reinforcing supply chains, or adjusting transportation networks to mitigate economic disruptions.

### **2. Abdel Mageed Saqr: Minister of Defence**

- a. As Minister of Defence, Abdel Mageed Saqr is responsible for overseeing Egypt's military readiness and strategic response to national security threats, including those arising from GERD-related disputes. He can coordinate with military leadership on potential deterrence strategies, border security, and naval operations to protect Egypt's water interests. In a crisis, he might be tasked with preparing military contingencies, securing critical infrastructure, or engaging in joint security coordination with Sudan.

### **3. Rania Al-Mashat: Minister of Planning, Economic Development & International Cooperation**

- a. Rania Al-Mashat plays a central role in shaping Egypt's long-term economic strategy, ensuring sustainable growth even amid water-related challenges from GERD. She is responsible for securing international financial support and economic partnerships to counteract potential economic disruptions caused by water scarcity. In a crisis, she could engage in diplomatic economic negotiations

with international institutions and donors to mitigate economic fallout and fund infrastructure resilience projects.

**4. Mohamed Ayman Ashour: Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research**

- a. Mohamed Ayman Ashour oversees Egypt's research institutions, which play a crucial role in assessing the environmental and hydrological impacts of GERD on Egypt. He can coordinate scientific studies on water management, alternative irrigation technologies, and policy recommendations for crisis adaptation. In the event of a crisis, he could mobilize university research teams to model scenarios for water conservation, inform government decision-making with empirical data, or develop innovative technologies to reduce Egyptian reliance on GERD-controlled water flows.

**5. Mahmoud Tawfik: Minister of Interior**

- a. Mahmoud Tawfik is responsible for Egypt's internal security, ensuring stability in case of domestic unrest triggered by water shortages or economic distress from GERD. He can oversee law enforcement responses to protests, safeguard critical infrastructure, and counter potential sabotage attempts related to the crisis. In a worst-case scenario, he could be tasked with maintaining public order, controlling demonstrations, and coordinating with intelligence agencies to address security threats.

**6. Badr Abdelatty: Minister of Foreign Affairs**

- a. As Egypt's top diplomat, Badr Abdelatty is responsible for leading negotiations and diplomatic efforts to resolve disputes over GERD through regional and international mediation. Alongside other delegates, he can engage with the African Union, the United Nations, and major global powers to rally support for Egypt's position on Nile water rights. If diplomacy fails, he might oversee efforts to impose economic or political pressure on Ethiopia through international partnerships and legal mechanisms.

**7. Ahmed Kouchouk: Minister of Finance**

- a. Ahmed Kouchouk manages Egypt's fiscal policy and public finances, ensuring economic stability in the face of GERD-related disruptions. He can reallocate government funds to support water infrastructure projects, food security measures, and economic stabilization initiatives amongst other finance-related responsibilities. In a crisis, he could coordinate emergency financial responses, including securing loans, issuing bonds, or adjusting subsidies to counteract the economic impact of water shortages.

**8. Yasmine Fouad: Minister of Environment**

- a. Yasmine Fouad is responsible for assessing and mitigating the environmental consequences of GERD on Egypt's ecosystems and water quality. She can lead

efforts to develop national adaptation strategies, including sustainable water conservation and pollution control initiatives. During a crisis, she might collaborate with international environmental organizations to highlight the ecological risks posed by GERD and advocate for cooperative water management solutions.

**9. Adnan Al-Fangari: Minister of Justice**

- a. Adnan Al-Fangari oversees Egypt's legal framework, ensuring compliance with international and domestic laws in disputes related to GERD. He can work on legal cases against Ethiopia in international courts or arbitral tribunals, advocating for Egypt's rights under historical treaties. In a crisis, he could facilitate emergency legal measures, such as enforcing water rationing policies or prosecuting actions deemed harmful to national security.

**10. Mohamed Shaker El-Markabi: Minister of Electricity and Energy**

- a. Mohamed Shaker El-Markabi is responsible for Egypt's energy security, which could be impacted if GERD disrupts hydroelectric power generation from the Nile. He can oversee contingency planning for alternative energy sources and manage potential power shortages caused by reduced water flow. In a crisis, he might accelerate the development of renewable energy projects, negotiate energy imports, or implement conservation measures to ensure stability.

**11. El Sayed El Quseir: Minister of Agriculture and Land Reclamation**

- a. El Sayed El Quseir oversees Egypt's agricultural sector, which is heavily dependent on Nile water for irrigation and food production. He can develop strategies to mitigate reduced water availability, such as promoting drought-resistant crops and improving irrigation efficiency. During a crisis, he might implement emergency food security policies, including import adjustments and government support for struggling farmers.

**12. Hani Sewilam: Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation**

- a. Hani Sewilam is responsible for managing Egypt's water resources, ensuring the country's water security amid GERD-related disputes. He can coordinate water conservation initiatives, dam operations, and international water negotiations. In a crisis, he might oversee emergency water rationing, expedite desalination projects, and enforce policies to maximize water efficiency.

**13. Tareq El-Molla: Minister of Petroleum**

- a. Tareq El-Molla ensures Egypt's energy supply remains stable, including securing fuel reserves that might be needed if GERD affects power generation. He can play a role in energy diplomacy, leveraging oil and gas exports to strengthen Egypt's geopolitical position in negotiations. In a crisis, he might oversee the strategic use of fuel reserves to prevent economic disruption or support military readiness.

**14. Mohamed Gad: Egyptian Ambassador to Ethiopia, Permanent Representative of Egypt to the African Union**

- a. Mohamed Gad serves as Egypt's primary diplomatic link to Ethiopia, managing negotiations and maintaining diplomatic channels. He can convey Egypt's concerns directly to Ethiopian officials and seek mediation through the African Union. If tensions escalate, he might work on de-escalation strategies or facilitate backchannel negotiations to prevent open conflict.

**15. Alaa Mohamed Salaheldin Hegazy: Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations**

- a. Alaa Mohamed Salaheldin Hegazy represents Egypt at the UN, advocating for resolutions and international pressure on Ethiopia regarding GERD. He can coordinate with global powers to frame GERD as an international security concern and push for intervention or arbitration. During a crisis, he might push for UN Security Council discussions, sanctions, or emergency resolutions in Egypt's favor.

**16. Hassan Mahmoud Rashad: Director of the General Intelligence Service**

- a. Hassan Mahmoud Rashad oversees Egypt's intelligence operations, including monitoring Ethiopia's strategic intentions regarding GERD. He can coordinate intelligence-gathering efforts to assess potential security threats and geopolitical maneuvering. In a crisis, he might oversee covert diplomatic or security operations to safeguard Egypt's interests.

**17. Ahmed Fathy Khalifa: Chief of the General Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces**

- a. Ahmed Fathy Khalifa is responsible for Egypt's military preparedness and operational planning in response to GERD-related conflicts. He can develop contingency strategies, oversee troop deployments, and manage military logistics. If tensions escalate, he might assume an important role in potential military operations or strategic maneuvers aimed at safeguarding Egypt's water security.

**18. Mohamed Rabie: Chairman and Managing Director of the Suez Canal Authority**

- a. Mohamed Rabie oversees the Suez Canal, a critical economic asset that could be leveraged in diplomatic negotiations over GERD. He can play a role in strategic economic responses, such as trade restrictions on Ethiopia if tensions rise. In a crisis, he could implement measures affecting global trade routes to pressure Ethiopia indirectly.

**19. Ibrahim Saber Khalil: Governor of Cairo**

- a. Ibrahim Saber Khalil manages Cairo's local governance, ensuring stability in Egypt's capital amid public concerns over GERD. He can oversee urban water distribution and emergency response measures in case of severe shortages. In a crisis, he might manage mass protests, coordinate humanitarian aid, and

implement local conservation policies.